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use#LAATHE ARCHITECTURE OF INCLUSION: EVIDENCE 
FROM CORPORATE DIVERSITY PROGRAMS 
Ever since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed employment discrimi- 
nation,  governments,  colleges, and  corporations  have  tried  to  understand 
what  the law means.'  Employers have tried to integrate workforces,  some 
with more enthusiasm than ~thers.~  Change has been slower than1 those who 
passed  the Civil Rights Act might have imagined it would be.3  Given the 
slow progress in the academy, National Science Foundation ("NSF")  deputy 
director Joseph Bordogna designed the ADVANCE program in 1999 to pro- 
mote the integration of women in the science and engineering fields that the 
NSF funds.4  In  2001, ADVANCE, under  the  leadership of  Alice  Hogan, 
considered the first round of applications for grants for institutional ~hange.~ 
The typical grant lasts for five years and provides several million dollars to 
colleges and universities that propose institutional  changes to promote wo- 
men in science and engineering.'j 
As with most efforts to reduce gender segregation in the government, 
academia, and the corporate  world,'  ADVANCE has been little studied for 
evidence of  its efficacy.  Now  some twenty  programs  have been initiated, 
and we have the opportunity to observe which strategies have succeeded and 
which  have not.  Susan  Sturm provides  the first systematic  analysis  of  a 
* Frank Dobbin is Professor of Sociology, Harvard University; Ph.D., Stanford Uni- 
versity, 1987; B.A., Oberlin College, 1980. Alexandra Kalev is an Assistant Professor ol' 
Sociology, University of Arizona; Ph.D., Princeton University, 2005; B.A., Tel Aviv Uni- 
versity,  1995. 
' See  Lauren  B. Edelman, Legality  and  the Endogeneity  of  Law, in LEGALITY  AND 
COMMUNITY:  ON  THE INTELLECTUAL  LEGACY  OF PHILIP  SELZNICK  187-202 (Robert A. Ka- 
gan, Martin Krygier & Kenneth I. Winston eds., 2002). 
See generally  Nicholas Pedriana & Robin Stryker, Political  Culture  Wars 1960s 
Style: Equal Employment Opportunity-Afirmative  Action Law and the Philadelphia Plan, 
103 AM.  J. SOC. 633 (1997). 
"ee  generally Donald Tomaskovic-Devey et al., Documenting Desegregation: Seg- 
regation in American  Workplaces by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, 1966-2003, 71 AM. SOC. 
REV.  565 (2006) (examining rates of  desegregation in employment since the 1960s). 
Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing  Workplace Equity in Higher 
Education, 29  HARV.  J.L. & GENDER  247, 275 (2006). 
Id. at 277. 
'  National  Science Foundation,  A-Z  Index of  Funding  Opportunities, available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/funding/azindex.jsp  (last visited March  19, 2007). 
'See  Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, Best Practices or Best Guesses? 
Assessing  the Efica~y  of  Corporute Affirmative Action and  Diversity  Policies, 71 AM. 
Soc. REV.  589, 590 (2006). 280  Harvard Journal of Law & Gender  [Vol. 30 
landmark program, one that has clocked some of the greatest gains for wo- 
men to date, at the University of Michigan.* 
In this commentary  on Sturm's pathbreaking  analysis we explore the 
generalizability of  some of Sturm's findings to the  corporatc:  world using 
unique data from a longitudinal study of diversity efforts at more than 800 
American films over thirty years.'  Sturm identifies key diversity strategies 
that have proven successful at the University of Michigan.I0 We ask whether 
corresponding strategies in the corporate sector have led to increases in the 
numbers  of  white  women, black  women,  and  black  men  in management. 
Our findings are based on the most detailed data yet analyzed on corporate 
diversity efforts and their effects on actual diversity. 
Our findings lend striking support to Sturm's analysis and insights.  In 
the corporate world, as in academia, programs that establish clear leadership 
and responsibility for change have produced the greatest gains in diversity. 
Programs that integrate the roles of corporate leadership and equity leader- 
ship are most successful in business, as they appear to be in the academy. 
We find that programs that create public accountability have led to signifi- 
cant increases in the presence  of  all three underrepresented  groups in man- 
agement: white women, black women, and black men.  As in the academy, 
those  programs  that  use  public  resources  to  promote  the  spread  of  new 
knowledge about how to enhance opportunity  are more successful in busi- 
ness.  We  compare  these  programs  to  other  popular,  and  expensive, 
programs. 
This Essay proceeds  as follows: in Part I we discuss Sturm's two in- 
sights on leadership  and public accountability.  We describe the corporate 
leadership strategies and public accountability programs that in our view are 
the closest corollaries to the programs Sturm describes at the {Jniversity of 
Michigan and at NSF's ADVANCE.  In Part 11, we examine the efficacy of 
these initiatives in the corporate world.  We look at whether managerial di- 
versity increases in the organizations that adopt the leadership programs and 
in the organizations that fall under the accountability measures. 
Sturm, supra note 4, at 282-87. 
'The  findings we draw on were reported in Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, En- 
forcement  of Civil Rights Law in Private Workplaces: Compliance Reviews and Lnwsuits 
Before and Afrer Reagan, 31 L. & Soc. INQUIRY  855 (2006); see also Kalev, Dobbin & 
Kelly, supm note 7. 
'" Sturm, supra  note 4, at 283-85  (describing strategies  such as  assembling teams 
with experience "in promoting gender and racial equity," conducting a survey to pinpoint 
problems, and developing and implementing targeted initiatives). 20071  Evidence from Corporate Diversity Programs  28 1 
I.  Two INSIGHTS  FROM  SUSAN  STURM'S  THE  ARCHITECTURE  OF  ~NCLUSION 
AND THEIR  COROLLARIES  IN CORPORATIONS 
Susan Sturm develops three insights from her case study of the Univer- 
sity of Michigan ADVANCE program.I1  We are able to examine evidence 
for two of these insights from the corporate world.  The first concerns how 
the University of Michigan has created the leadership necessary to sustain an 
effective diversity program.  The second concerns what it is about the AD- 
VANCE program that has created an effective system of public accountabil- 
ity.  Although their effects have not been explored in previous research, the 
corporate world has experience with the kinds of  leadership initi~atives  and 
public accountability that Sturm prescribes for academia.  We are not able to 
assess Sturm's third insight-that  equity efforts require legitimacy and that 
framing them as enhancing "institutional  citizenship" has been a successful 
legitimating  strategy-in  the corporate world. 
We begin this Section by discussing Sturm's theory of diversity leader- 
ship and its corollaries in corporations.  We then move to presenting Sturm's 
theory of public accountability and its corollaries in corporations;. 
A.  Sturm's i'heory that Leadership is Vital to an Effectiive 
Diversity Initiative 
Max Weber  argued  that to achieve  specific goals,  executives should 
appoint professionals, give them authority to pursue those goals, and make 
them  ac~ountable.'~  Sturm's analysis  suggests a modification  of  Weber's 
view. 
1.  Hybrid Roles: Folding Responsibility for  Gender Equity into 
Functional Leadership 
In preparation for her  discussion of  how the University of  Michigan 
created an effective diversity initiative, Sturm criticizes one of the unantici- 
pated consequences of  professionalizing and compartmentalizing pursuit of 
every organizational goal in the typical university  as in the typical corpora- 
tion:13 diversity  management  has been  allocated to  a  special  field  within 
human resources management.14 In the typical university, the people respon- 
sible for carrying out the organization's  mission and for malung key hiring 
and promotion decisions-professors-have  little to do with  the diversity 
I'  Sturm, supru note 4. 
MAX  WEBER,  ECONOMY  AND  SOCIETY  960 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 
1978). 
''  Sturm, supra note 4, at 255-58. 
l4 See  SANFORD  M. JACOBY,  THE  EMBEDDED  CORPORATION:  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE 
AND EMPLOYMENT  RELATIONS  IN JAPAN  AND THE UNITED  STATES  7&100  (2005) (discuss- 
ing the historical causes of human resource management's  low status). 282  Harvard Journal of Law & Gender  [Vol. 30 
officers.15 As a result, Sturm argues, although establishing responsibility for 
the goal of equity  may  be  essential, an unintended  consequence in  many 
organizations (but not at Michigan) is that the person responsiole for increas- 
ing diversity is herself segregated and kept out of the mainstream in decision 
making.  I 
Sturrn finds that at the University of Michigan, this problem was solved 
by the creation of hybrid roles, folding responsibility for gender equity into 
existing leadership roles.17 In  Sturm's  view, the University  of Michigan's 
program  is  effective  because  diversity  managers  are not  segregated  in an 
office devoted to  diversity alone, but rather are integrated members of  the 
academic hierarchy.I8 Diversity trainers are regular members (of the faculty, 
who have  studied  the scholarly  literature  on diversity, rather than outside 
consultants;  the leaders  of  the ADVANCE  program are regular high-level 
university  administrators,  rather  than  isolated  diversity  experts.19 Having 
leaders of  the organization participate in the design and implementation  of 
equity efforts is key to the effectiveness of the program, in Sturm's view.?O 
2.  Overcoming Decentralization 
The marginalization of diversity is all the more pronounced in academia 
because  of  the  extreme  decentralization  of  decision  making.21 Decisions 
about hiring and promotion are made by individual departments that are una- 
ware of one another's actions and of the larger pattern of hiring and promo- 
tion by sex and race.22 Overcoming decentralization is therefore essential for 
effective diversity leadership. 
B.  Corollary Leadership Programs in Corporations 
We  considered the effectiveness of these two approaches I:O  improving 
gender  equity-integrating  gender  equity  with  functional leadership  roles 
and  overcoming  decentralization-by  investigating  several  corporate 
programs. 
First, we tested Sturm's hybrid-roles thesis that it is better to involve 
key administrators who have wide-ranging authority rather than isolating the 
gender  equity role.  We  examined  whether it is more  effective to  have  a 
diversity task force, composed of employees involved in regular line-man- 
agement roles from across the organization, than to have a full-time expert. 
Is Sturm, supra note 4, at 255-58. 
"See id. at 255 (discussing compartmentalization). 
l7 Id. at 299-301. 
lX Id. 
' "d. 
2U  id. 
'I  See id. at 258. 
''  Sec  id. (discussing fragmented authority structure). 20071  Evidence from Corporate Diversity Programs  283 
Second, we tested Sturm's idea that university decentralization thwarts 
progress.  We examined whether setting annual affirmative action goals is 
effective and whether institutionalizing responsibility for diversity by having 
a designated diversity manager is more effective than merely having an af- 
firmative action  plan.  This  test  allowed us  to  observe an  implication  of 
Sturm's centralization hypothesis, namely that it is best to have a full-time 
expert in place.23 Both scholars and consultants advise ongoing coordination 
and  monitoring of  diversity progress by  dedicated  staff  members  or task 
forces.24 
Third, we tested  the  idea  that  top management  support -For diversity 
programs benefits diversity efforts.  Due to the difficulty of directly measur- 
ing whether executive and diversity roles are conjoined, as Sturrn prescribes, 
we chose to look at the proportion of top executives who are women and the 
proportion who are minorities.  We examined the effects of gender and racial 
diversity among the ten highest corporate leaders.  This provided a broad test 
of the effect of top-management support for diversity programs. 
Next, we discuss these three programs, and top-management diversity, 
to explain how they correspond to Sturm's program suggestions.  We also 
review previous research on these programs, which has been sparse and in- 
conclusive for the most part. 
1.  The Diversity Task Force 
At Michigan, university leaders took the lead on the equity effort.25  The 
hybrid role, academic leaderlequity leader, helped ensure success.26 The co- 
rollary in business has been diversity task forces or committees, comprising 
unit heads who take on the work of devising and implementing equity mea- 
sures; these have spread since the early  1980~~'  Committees are typically 
charged with overseeing diversity initiatives, brainstorming to identify reme- 
dies, and monitoring progress.28 AS Stunn found in her investigation of  the 
accounting and consulting giant Deloitte & Touche, the diversity task force 
consisted of a series of ongoing groups responsible for analyzing the gender 
21 See id. at 288-89  (discussing "organizational  catalysts," insiders with training and 
expertise in diversity). 
24 See MARY  J. WINTERLE,  WORK  FORCE  DIVERSITY:  CORPORATE  CHALLENGES,  CORPO- 
RATE  RESPONSES  25-26  (1992)  (discussing  corporate diversity  task  forces  and  internal 
monitoring programs); Barbara F. Reskin, Including Mechanisms in Our Models of As- 
criptive Inequality, 68 AM. SOC.  REV. 1, 16-17  (2003) (advocating study and monitoring 
of  allocation mechanisms as part of an effort to eliminate inequality); Susan Sturm, Sec- 
ond  Generation Employment  Discrimination: A  Structural  Approach,  101 COLUM.  L. 
REV.  458, 531-35  (2001) (citing the effectiveness of task forces and monitoring at com- 
bating discrimination). 
25 Sturm, supra  note 4, at 299-300. 
Id. 
='See generally Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 7 (evaluating various diversity 
programs, including task forces and committees). 
?Vee  id. at 590. Harvard Journal of  Law & Gender  [Vol. 30 
gap, recommending remedial steps, and establishing systems for monitoring 
results and ensuring ac~ountability.~~  These task forces create hybrid roles in 
which unit managers become equal-opportunity  experts.30 
2.  The Ajfirmative Action Plan and the Diversity Manager 
We  examined  the effect of  centralizing  responsibility  for equality  of 
opportunity to explore Sturm's thesis that decentralization undermines equal 
opportunity programs.  Since 1971, the Office of Federal Contract Compli- 
ance Prograins ("OFCCP), the agency President Lyndon Johnson set up to 
monitor affirmative action among federal contractors, required bigger con- 
tractors to assemble data each year on workforce characteristics and write an 
affirmative  action  plan.31 Corporations,  universities,  and  colleges  wrote 
plans evaluating their own workforces, specifying goals for female and mi- 
nority representation based on labor market analyses, and sketching timeta- 
ble~.~~  The order specified that firms should assign responsibility to a staff 
member, though this need not be their sole re~ponsibility.~~  The few studies 
that examine effects of  affirmative action plans are inconcl~sive.~~ 
In Sturm's  model, having  a full-time diversity  manager  should better 
counter  decentralized  decision  making  than  having  an affirmative action 
plan alone, as the most important effect of the diversity manager may be to 
centralize responsibility."  The next step up from installing a diversity man- 
ager is  creating  a distinct department.  Edelman  and Petterson  show  that 
29 Sturm, supra note 24, at 492. 
'O  See id. at 492-99. 
"  Affirmative action status does not fully predict whether an employer has an affirm- 
ative action plan.  Employers are not required to file these plans with the OFCCP, and 
some erriployers simply do not create plans.  Kalev & Dobbin, supra note 9, at 866.  On 
the other hand, noncontractors sometimes voluntarily prepare alfirmative action plans. 
either in preparation for applying for a government contract or to symbolize their open- 
ness to diversity.  See BARBARA  RESKIN,  THE  REALITIES  OF AFFIRMATIVE  ACTION  15-17 
(1998). 
"  See generally  CONFERENCE  BOARD,  IN DIVERSITY  is STKENGTH:  CAPITALIZING  ON 
THE NEW WORK  FORCE  (Judith Alster et al. eds., 1992) (recounting CEOs' perspectivcs 
about their companies'  diversity programs). 
"  41 C.F.R. 3 60-2.1  7(a) (2002). 
"See James N. Baron, Brian S. Mittman & Andrew E. Newman, Targets of Oppoflu- 
niry:  Organizational and Environmental Determinants  of  Gender Integration  within the 
Califof-nia  Civil Sewices, 1976-1985, 96 AM. J. Soc. 1362 (1991) (finding slower inte- 
gration associated with the adoption of  affirmative action plan, probably because earlier 
improvements left little room for change); Lauren B. Edelman & Stephen M. Petterson, 
Symbols and Substance in Organizational Response ro  Civil Riglzts Law, 17  RES.  IN SOC. 
STRATIFICATION  & MOBILITY  107 (1999) (finding no positive effect of  affirmative action 
plan); Jonathan S. Leonard, The Impact of  Affirmative Action Regulation and Equal Em- 
ployment Law on Black Employment, 4 J. ECON.  PERSP.  47 (1990) [hereinafter Leonard, 
Impncr]; Jonathan S. Leonard, What Promises Are  Worth: The Impact of Afirntative Ac- 
tion Goals, 20  J.  HUM.  RESOURCES  3 (1985) (finding that goals employers sct for hiring 
white women, black women, and black men did have positive effects, although the goals 
were wildly optimistic). 
"  See Sturm, supra note 4, at 255-58. 20071  Evidence from Corporate Diversity Programs  285 
equal-opportunity departments do not increase gender and racial diversity on 
their own, but that they do expand diversity recruitment programs, which in 
turn improve diver~ity.~~ 
3.  A Diverse Leadership 
i 
Leadership is important in Sturm's theory of gender inclusion because  3 
organizations cannot sustain an effort to expand inclusion without it."  Wo-  i 
men and minorities in top leadership positions may help women and minori-  1 
1 
ties move into management positions below them for several reasons: they  , 
may be committed to equity; they may also improve opportunities by acting 
I 
as role models, by reducing stereotype threat or self-handicapping by women 
and minorities,  or  by  reducing  the  stress  associated  with  tokeni~m.'~  In 
I 
many corporations, the decision to put women and minorities in high-profile 
positions was part of a broader diversity strategy.  Since the late 1980s, busi- 
ness leaders have argued that to recruit the best managerial talent they would 
have to demonstrate that women  and minorities could succeed.19 As we do 
not have a dlrect measure of the commitment of leaders to gender and racial 
equity, we examined the gender and racial mix of top executives as a proxy. 
Thus far we have discussed Sturm's insight on effective diversity lead- 
ership within  academia and presented corollary strategies in the corporate 
world.  Next we turn to Sturm's argument that effective public accountability 
is required  to ensure  that  efforts  to  improve  gender  equity  have  a  real 
impact. 
C.  Stum's Theory of Effective Public Accountability 
In both the corporate world and academia, the principal public account- 
ability mechanisms have been the Equal Employment Opportunity Cornmis- 
sion ("EEOC")  charge system, the discrimination lawsuit, and the federal 
compliance review system for government contractors.  EEOC charges were 
first filed in 1965, shortly after the agency was established.  Since the mid- 
1960s as well, corporations and universities have been subject to discrimina- 
36 Edelman & Petterson, supra  note 34, at 118-23. 
"See Sturm, supra note 4, at 258. 
38 For a discussion of tokenism and stereotype threat, see generally ROSABETH  MOSS 
KANTER,  MEN AND  WOMEN  OF  THE  CORPORATION  (1977)  (examining  the problem  of 
tokenism and suggesting ways to ameliorate it); Steven J. Spencer, Claude M. Steele & 
Diane M. Quinn, Stereotype nreat and Wornen's Math Performance, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
Soc. PSYCHOL.  4 (1999) (examining women's response to stereotype threat in  the area of 
mathematics). 
39 See IN  DIVERSITY  IS STRENGTH,  ,~u~~ra  note 32, at  15 (arguing that diversity should 
be ~romoted  "because it's good business"):  MICHAEL  L. WHEELER,  DIVERSITY  TRAIN~NG  7 
(1g94) (noting growing inkrest in  corporh;e diversity training); Elaine K. Yakura, EEO 
Law  and Managing  Diversity, in MANAGING  DIVERSITY:  HUMAN  RESOURCE  STRATEGIES 
FOR TRANSFORMING  THE WORKPLACE  25,43 (Ellen Ernst Kossek & Sharon A. Lobe1 eds., 
1995) (quoting Levi Strauss CEO Robert D. Haas on  the importance of diversity). 286  Harvard Journal of Law & Gender  [Vol. 30 
tion lawsuits under Title VLI  and Title IX by women and members of minor- 
ity groups.J0 Many large private corporations and virtually all universities, 
public and private, are subject to further accountability when they serve as 
federal contractors.ll  Since the 1960s, federal contractors have been subject 
to OFCCP oversight and, in particular, compliance reviews  and debarment 
as c0ntractors.4~  Debarment is rare, so the real sanction faced by  firms and 
universities is the compliance review itself.43 
By contrast to these regulatory mechanisms, designed mainly to sanc- 
tion employers that do not practice equal opportunity, the NSF's ADVANCE 
program offers a model of public accountability based in positive incentives, 
institution-specific equity strategies, and sharing of the best practices of suc- 
cessful colleges and uni~ersities.~~  Sturm sees great promise in this model. 
Her two principal insights about effective public accountability have to do 
with (1) the distinction between incentives and disincentives and (2) the reli- 
ance on communities of practice for expertise. We discuss these two below. 
1.  Regulatory Incentives and Disincentives 
Sturm points out that neither regulatory oversight through the OFCCP 
nor lawsuits under Title  Vll have been very successful at promoting gender 
equity in acade1nia.4~  The OFCCP, she argues, has not vigorously pursued 
compliance reviews and in fact does not have the specific knowledge of  the 
academic career system that it would  need to conduct  rigorous reviews.46 
Moreover, it is not clear that it could fashion useful remedies to the problem 
of inequity in a~ademia.4~  Lawsuits have been rare in the academy, and they 
have been difficult to win in part because successful suits generally depend 
on statistical evidence that a class of workers has been  but uni- 
versity departments are too small to generate statistical samples of adequate 
40 See generally HUGH  DAVIS  GRAHAM,  THE  CIVIL  RIGHTS  ERA:  ORIGINS  AND DEVEL- 
OPMENT  OF  NATIONAL  POLICY  1960-1972  (1990)  (examining  the  history  of  the  Civil 
Rights Era, including the enactment of  the Civil Rights Act of  1964). 
4' Corporations receive government contracts for everything from paper towels to jet 
fighters.  Any  corporation with $50,000 in  federal contracts is subject to federal over- 
sight, under terms established by Lyndon Johnson's  1965 Executive Order 11246.  Col- 
leges  and universities are  subject to  OFCCP oversight due to the  federal  grants they 
receive.  Kalev & Dobbin, supra note 9, at 566. 
42 Bernard E. Anderson,  7he Ebb and  Flow  of Enforcing  Executive  Order 11246, 
86(2) AMERICAN  ECONOMIC  REVIEW  298, 298-99  (1996). 
41 See Kalev & Dobbin, supra note 9, at 864 (discussing the decline in  debarments 
and other sanctions during the 1980s). 
"  See Sturm, supra note 4, at 277. 
4Vd.  at 26 1-70. 
4Vd.  at 266-67. 
47  Id. at 267. 
"  Id. at 263-64. 20071  Evidence from Corporate Diversity  Programs  287 
size.49 Moreover, faculty members are often reluctant to resort to lawsuits 
for fear of tarnishing their professional  reputation^.^^ 
Sturm argues that the positive inducements offered by the ADVANCE 
program  are more likely  to be effective than  the  weak disincentives pro- 
duced  by  lawsuits  and  compliance  reviews  of  universitie~.~~  ADVANCE 
pays for the cost of program changes and encourages accountability through 
annual reports  on both program implementation and effectiveness, supple- 
mented by  comprehensive reviews at the three-year mark.52 
2.  Leveraging  Communities of Practice 
One of  the advantages that ADVANCE  offers is that it draws on ex- 
isting networks of experts in gender equity, both inside the university and 
~utside.~%owledge  of successful innovations at other universities spreads 
through  this network,  so that in the end, program innovations that help to 
increase gender equity spread.s4 Sturm argues that the ADVANCE program 
created a community of practice  and encouraged universities to share the 
most effective equal-opportunity programs with one another.55 
D.  Corollaly Measures of Public Accountability  in the Corporate World 
We are not able to examine all of the mechanisms of public accounta- 
bility that are embodied in the ADVANCE program, but our data allow us to 
examine both  the ineffectiveness of  disincentives and the  effectiveness  of 
reliance on communities of practice. 
I.  Regulatoly Disincentives: EEOC Charges and Discrimination 
Lawsuits 
First, we examined the effects of two lunds of negative incentives, both 
faced by corporations as well as by colleges and universities: EEOC charges 
and lawsuits.  Lawsuits, whether they are won or lost by the firm, represent a 
relatively  expensive  di~incentive.~~  Sturm  states  that  EEOC  charges  and 
lawsuits  are not pursued  often enough in academia.  Our analysis helps to 
answer an important question: If  EEOC charges and lawsuits were pursued 
more  often,  and  more  effectively,  in  academia,  would  they  be  likely  to 
work? 
49 Id. 
Id. at 263. 
51  Id.  at 271. 
52 Id. at 280-81. 
51 Id. at 28 1-82. 
"Id.  at 282. 
"  See id. 
56 See id;  Kalev & Dobbin, supra note 9. 288  Harvard Journal of  Law & Gender  [Vol. 30 
a.  EEOC Charges 
Title  VII  originally  gave  the  EEOC  no  power  of  enforcement,  but 
granted it the authority to investigate charges and seek voluntary conciliation 
where it found discrirninati~n.~~  The EEOC could also draw up guidelines 
for nondiscrimination, but these guidelines had  no  legal status.58 
b.  Title VII Lawsuits 
Under  the  Civil Rights  Act  of  1964, the  EEOC had no  authority  to 
impose sanctions, but individuals had the right to bring suit.59  The Attorney 
General could bring suit in cases where a "pattern or practice" of resistance 
to  Title  VII  was  identified,  but  this  power  was  rarely  used.60 Congress 
amended the powers of the EEOC so that as of  1972 it could bring pattern- 
and-practice suits itself.61  Lawsuits create an immediate incentive to prevent 
discrimination because they make real the threat of  financial loss.62 Even 
unsuccessful lawsuits are often costly in terms of legal fees and lost business 
due to negative publicity.63 Evidence to date on the efficacy of lawsuits in 
promoting equity is thin.  Leonard finds that Title VII class action suits im- 
prove the employment status of blacks at the state  Skaggs uses EEO- 
1 reports from supermarkets for 1983 to 1998 to examine the effects of law- 
suits on workplace di~ersity.~~  In progressive federal court districts, super- 
markets that  experience  discrimination  lawsuits  subsequently  move  more 
women and Latinos, but not African Americans, into management.66 Fol- 
lowing  lawsuits,  competitor  supermarkets  also  move  more  women  into 
rnar~agement.~' 
1963-1972  6 (1973). 
5Vd.  at 6-7. 
"  Id.  at  7. 
60 Id. 
"  RICHARD  LEMPERT  & JOSEPH  SANDERS,  AN INVITATION  TO LAW  AND  SOCIAI.  SCI- 
ENCE:  DESERT,  DISPUTES,  AND DISTRIBUTION  379 (1986); Lauren B. Edelman. Legal Anzhi- 
guity and Symholic Structures: Orgatzizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM.  J. 
SOC.  1531, 1540 (1992). 
b2 See Jonathan Leonard, Anti-Discrin~inulion  or Reverse Discrimination:  The Impact 
of Changing Demographics, Title VII utzd Affirmative Action on Productivity, 19 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES  145, 149-50  (1 984). 
6'See id. at 150 (discussing the public relations effects of EEOC enforcement). 
'*  Id. at  17 1. 
65 Sheryl Skaggs, Discrimination Litigation: Implications for Women and 1Minorities 
in Retail Supermarket Management (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, North Caro- 
lina State University) (on file with author). 
hb Id. at 127. 
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2.  Communities of  Practice and  the Original Compliance Review 
System 
Second, we looked at whether a federal oversight system that, similar to 
the ADVANCE program, shares the knowledge and experience of successful 
employers can be effective.  In particular, we examined whether the OFCCP 
was effective when it saw its job as identifying successful equity strategies 
and encouraging employers to adopt those strategies. 
In the corporate  world, networks  of  diversity  experts meet regularly 
under  the auspices of  professional groups such as the  Society for Human 
Resources Management  ("SHRM")  and business  associations such  as  the 
Conference Board  and  the Bureau  of  National   affair^.^^  The EEOC also 
publishes  a list of  "best  pra~tices."~9  The first communities of  experts to 
share knowledge about practices were the members of  President Kennedy's 
private sector Plans for Progress, established in 1961,70  and the experts at the 
EEOC  and  the  OFCCP  who  drew  lessons  from  these  communities  and 
sought to use those lessons to inform corporate practice." 
The  OFCCP was active in disseminating new ideas about hiring and 
promotion practices during the 1970~.~~  It drew heavily on the program ex- 
periments of Plans for Progress employers and promoted a series of concrete 
changes  in  hiring  and  promotion  through  its  compliance  reviews.73 The 
OFCCP identified successful strategies and suggested that other employers 
adopt those  ~trategies.~"ernard  Anderson reports  that in  the  1970s, the 
OFCCP actively promoted permanent changes in how employers advertised 
jobs, reviewed applicants, and made hiring and promotion decisions.75 This 
is also related  to the issue of how to create sustained institutional change, 
another theme Professor Sturm  emphasize^.^^  The OFCCP visits were de- 
signed to change employment practices permanently, rather than to simply 
encourage firms to hire more women or rnin~rities.~~  To that end, OFCCP 
inspectors  scrutinized  hiring  and  promotion  and  asked  for  concrete 
"  See generally BUREAU  OF NATL  AFFAIRS,  EQUAL  EMPLOYMENT  OPPORTUNITY:  PRO- 
GRAMS AND RESULTS  (1976); RUTH  G. SCHAEFFER,  NONDISCRIMINATION  IN EMPLOYMENT- 
AND BEYOND  (1980). 
"  U.S. EQUAL  EMPLOYMENT  OPPORTUNITY  COMM'N,  'LB~~~O  EQUAL  EMPLOYMENT  OP- 
PORTUNITY  POLICES,  PROGRAMS,  AND PRACTICES  IN  THE PRIVATE  SECTOR  (1998). 
7'1 See GRAHAM,  supra note 40, at 51-59  (describing the implementation of Plans for 
Progress). 
7' See id.  at  196 (noting the influence of  Plans for Progress on the EEOC and other 
agencies). 
72 See  Anderson,  supra  note  42, at 299  (discussing  "hometown  plans"  that envi- 
sioned local agreements among contractors, unions, and other parties to increase employ- 
ment diversity). 
''  See id. 
73 See id. 
75 Id. 
76 See Sturm, supra note 4, at 287. 
77 See Anderson, supra note 42, at 299 (discussing the OFCCP's encouragement of 
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changes.78  Thus, while its regulatory role is quite different from that of the 
NSF ADVANCE program,  during the  1970s the  OFCCP served a similar 
function of  disseminating evidence from test cases. 
A regulatory change allows us to examine whether the OFCCP's strat- 
egy during the  1970s was effective.  The agency changed course in  1981, 
when President Reagan sought to turn over more control for compliance to 
employers themselve~.~~  The OFCCP increased the number of  compliance 
reviews significantly, but reduced sanctions and cut staffing, with the overall 
effect that compliance reviews were more rapid and less intrusive than they 
had been.80 The new regulatory strategy put an end to efforts to spread suc- 
cessful  innovation^.^^ 
Previous studies suggest that the early compliance reviews designed to 
promote the insights gleaned from practice communities, in Sturm's terms, 
may indeed have been effective.  Three studies show that early OFCCP com- 
pliance reviews had significant effects on the growth of  black employment 
and the movement of black men and women into better jobs, over and above 
the effect of  being a federal contract~r.~~  Being a contractor  stopped  im- 
proving  black employment  growth in the early and mid-1980s, coincident 
with the Reagan administration's new policy of  deregulati~n.~~  In line with 
these findings, Rodgers and Spriggs show that the OFCCP adopted a mod- 
estly more interventionist regulatory stance after Reagan stepped down.84 
7Vee  id. 
79 Id. at 300; ,see also Jonathan S. Leonard, Wage Disparities and Affirmative Action 
in the Late 1980s, 86 AM. ECON.  REV.  285, 288 (1996) ("[Tlhe administration of Ronald 
Reagan will not go down in history as a time in which the federal government aggres- 
sively fought discrimination."). 
"Jonathan  S. Leonard, Women and Afirmative Action, 3 J. ECON.  PERSP.  61, 73-74 
(1989); see also ALFRED  W.  BLUMROSEN,  MODERN  LAW:  THE  LAW  TRANSMISSION  SYSTEM 
AND EQUAL  EMPLOYMENT  OPPORTUNITY  274 (1971) (discussing reduced use of "goals and 
timetables"  in the  1980s); Anderson, supra note 42, at 300 (discussing the decrease in 
OFCCP sanctions during  the Reagan administration); Virginia duRivage,  The OFCCP 
Under the Reagan Administration: Afirrnative Action  in Retreat, 36 LAB.  L.J. 360, 364 
(1985); Edelman, sunra  note 61, at  1540 (noting a "decrease in  OFCCP enforcement  ,  - 
activity" in  1980s). ' 
*' See Anderson. sunra note 42.  at 300: see also Nancv  DiTomaso. The Manaped 
State:  Governmental ~e'or~anization  in the First Year of  the Reagan ~dministratiol,  1 
RES. m POL. SOC. 141, 158-59  (1985) (discussing the Reagan Administration's  federal 
budget strategies and deregulation policles between 1980 and 1982); Gary L. McDowell, 
Affirmative Inaction: The Brock-Meese Standoff on Federal Racial Quotas, 48 POL'Y  REV. 
32,  34  (1989)  (discussing  the  Reagan  administration's  hostility  toward  affirmative 
action). 
"  Morris Goldstein & Robert  Smith, The Estimated Impact  of Anti-Discrimination 
Laws Aimed at Federal Contractors, 29 INDUS.  & LAB.  REL.  REV.  523 (1976); Jonathan S. 
Leonard,  Employment  and  Occupational Advance  Under Afirmative Action,  66 REV. 
ECON.  & STAT.  377 (1984); Leonard, Impact, supra note 34. 
"  Leonard, Impact, supra note 34. 
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In this Section, we examine data that allow us to test Sturm's theories 
about how leaders can create a sustained and effective equity initiative and 
about how public accountability  measures  can be effective.  We  test these 
theories in the corporate sector. 
The data  we use come from two  sources.  The workforce data  were 
collected annually between  1971 and 2002 by the EEOC, which is charged 
with collecting  data from private  employers with  more than  one hundred 
workers and government contractors with more than $50,000 worth of  con- 
tracts and more than fifty workers.  The data cover the race, ethnicity, and 
gender of employees in nine broad occupational categories.  From that data 
set, we drew a random sample of workplaces, selecting from nine represen- 
tative industries.  We conducted a survey of the history of employment prac- 
tices at each establishment, asking questions covering the period 197  1-2002, 
in collaboration with the Princeton Survey Research Center.  We completed 
833 interviews for a response rate of  67%. 
In our analyses we use fixed-effect models which account, implicitly, 
for unobserved firm characteristics that do not vary over time and that may 
affect diversity (for example orgxiizational culture).  We also include a long 
list  of  variables  that  account  for  many  known  sources  of  change  in 
workforce diversity so that we are able to isolate effects of the programs and 
regulatory activities of interest, tracking whether they increased, reduced, or 
had no effect on the diversity of the managerial workforce. 
A.  Evidence  on Effective Leadership from  Corporate Diversity Programs 
We first report the results from an analysis of  annual data from 708 of 
these establish~nents~~  that examines changes in managerial composition fol- 
lowing the adoption of  different gender equity programs  and following in- 
creases in gender  and minority  representation  in the executive ranks.  For 
each establishment we have data for between five and thirty-two years, with 
a median of twenty-five years. 
The full statistical models, with sixty-four parameters and complete in- 
formation on the supplementary statistical tests we performed to confirm the 
results, are available else~here.~~  Here we show the effects of  the gender 
equity programs of interest, alongside those of  a few other popular programs 
for comparison. 
Above  we  suggested  three  ways  to  examine  the  generalizabilit~  of 
Sturm's theory of effective leadership: first, by testing Sturm's idea that by 
creating hybrid equity and leadership roles, organizations would better insti- 
8-' In this analysis, we exclude establishments  with missing data on key variables of 
interest. 
See Kalev & Dobbin, supra note 9; Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 7. 292  Harvard Journal of Law & Gender  [Vol. 30 
tutionalize and carry out the equity program.87 We looked at this by examin- 
ing the effect of  a diversity  task force comprising leaders from across the 
organization.  Second, we compared the effect of  centralizing responsibility 
for equity in an affirmative action plan  to the  effect of  hiring  a full-time 
diversity manager.88 Many employers without federal contracts wrote plans, 
and many with contracts neglected to write them, so we looked at the effect 
of having a plan, not of the effect of being a federal contractor.  We expected 
that having a plan would be effective, but that having a full-time manager 
would be more so.  Third, we tested the wider consequences of leadership by 
looking at the effects of  having women  and minorities represented in the 
firm's top management.89 
Table  1 reports results from a multiple regression analysis predicting 
the log odds of four groups in management jobs.  In Table 1, each row shows 
the effects of  a series of  different  equity programs  on a particular  group: 
white men, white women, black women, and black men.  Statistically signif- 
icant effects, positive and negative, are indicated with asterisks.  The coeffi- 
cients, or the estimated effects, can be read roughly as the percentage change 
in the  odds of  each group being in management that is solely  due to the 
adoption  the  program  under  consideration (or the relevant  change in top 
management diversity).  Where the estimated effects are not statistically sig- 
nificant (those not accompanied by asterisks), the analysis suggests that the 
programs in question do not have effects on the group under consideration. 
Figure  1 also  shows  the  estimated effects of  each program  on  each 
group.  The bars represent the estimated percentage change in the proportion 
of each group among managers following adoption of a particular program 
(or following an increase of one woman or minority among the top ten exec- 
utives) in the average organization that adopted such a program (or added a 
woman or a minority manager to the top ten positions).  Because women and 
African Americans are not well-represented in management to begin with, a 
large percentage increase in the proportion  may reflect  a small increase in 
the numbers of these groups in management.  Where the effect of a program 
was not statistically significant, we show it as zero.  Figure  1 gives a good 
sense of  the  relative efficacy of  these programs by  isolating the  effect of 
each program. 
Our first question, about the efficacy of the integration of gender equity 
and leadership roles,90 receives  a positive answer.  It is more  effective to 
have a diversity task force, composed of unit leaders from across the firm, 
than to have a diversity staff person.  This can be seen in the  size of  the 
coefficients estimating the change in managerial diversity following the in- 
troduction  of  Diversity Committee compared to those of  Diversity Staff in 
"  See supra notes 25-30  and accompanying  text. 
"See supra notes 21-22,  and accompanying  text. 
"See supra notes 31-36  and accompanying  text. 
90 See  supra notes 23-24  and accompanying  text. 20071  Evidence from Corporate Diversity Programs  293 
White 
Men 
Hybrid Leadership Roles 
Diversity Committee  -0.081** 
(0.028) 
Centralization 
Affirmative Action Plan  -0.078** 
(0.017) 
Diversity Staff  -0.055 
(0.033) 
Top  Management Diversity 
Proportion minorities  -0.002 
in top management  (0.001) 
Proportion women  -0.002** 
in top management  (0.001) 
Other, Popular, Diversity Initiatives 
Managerial Bias  - 
Diversity Training  -0.038 
(0.021) 
Diversity Evaluations  0.028 
(0.027) 
Social Isolation 
Networking Programs  -0.083** 
(0.027) 
Mentoring Programs  -0.01 1 
(0.033) 
White 
Women 
Black 
Women 
Black 
Men 
Note:  Data  shown  are  coefficients  from  seemingly  unrelated  regression  with 
standard errors in  parentheses. The analyses include establishment and year fixed 
effects. All independent variables are lagged by  one year. Number of parameters is 
64. N (organization-year; organizations)=  16,265; 708. The full model can be seen 
in Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 7. 
Table 1 and also in the bars in Figure 1.  Here the difference may not seem 
dramatic, but keep in mind that a diversity committee may meet irregularly 
and costs the organization little, and we compared this minimal investment 
with the larger one of hiring a full-time expert. 
Our second question, does centralization of gender equity responsibility 
prove effective,g1  is also answered with a resounding yes.  Establishing an- 
"  See  supra notes 23-24  and accompanying text. Harvard Journal of  Law & Gender  [Vol. 30 
Diversity  Affirmative  Diversity  Women Top  Minority Top 
Taskforce  Action Plan  Staff  Managers  Managers 
1  White Men  White Women  Black Women  Black Men  ) 
nual affirmative action plans, representing the simplest method of centraliza- 
tion, shows significant negative effects on white men, and positive effects on 
white women and black men.  But, as the pattern in Figure 1 clearly indi- 
cates, the estimated changes in managerial diversity following the appoint- 
ment  of  a  full-time  diversity  staff  person  are  larger  than  those  for  an 
affirmative action plan, and all three effects of  interest (on white women, 
black  women, black men)  are statistically significant.  The conclusion we 
can draw is that it helps to have a plan, but it is better to have a full-time 
staff person devoted to equity. 
Our third question concerned leadership more generally: Does a diverse 
corporate leadership increase the diversity of  the managerial ranks?92 Yes. 
Firms that  add  minorities  in top positions  see faster  growth  of  blacks  in 
lower level management.  Firms that add women at the top see faster growth 
of  white and black women in management. 
The effects of  these programs are particularly striking when we  com- 
pare them with the effects of  other popular (and expensive) equity programs. 
Diversity training, diversity performance evaluations for managers, network- 
ing programs, and mentoring programs all show uneven effects.  As Table 1 
shows, diversity training had a negative effect on black women.  Perform- 
ance evaluations show negative effects on black men and small positive ef- 
fects on white women.  Networking programs  show the same pattern, and 
"See supra Part I.B. 20071  Evidence from Corporate Diversity  Programs  295 
mentoring programs only show a positive  effect for black women.  We do 
not present a separate figure to show the effects of these programs graphi- 
cally because the effects are generally  small or insignificant. 
Taken  together,  these  findings  provide  striking  support  for  Sturm's 
ideas.  Building hybrid  leadership roles-in  which  organizational  leaders 
take on responsibility for gender equity-clearly  makes a difference.  Cen- 
tralization of the solution helps as well, and we suspect this is particularly 
true for organizations characterized by  decentralized personnel systems and 
unit autonomy in hiring and promotion decisions.  Finally, committed lead- 
ership, where women and minorities make it to the top ten executive posi- 
tions, is clearly important in the corporate world. 
B.  Evidence from  Corporate Experience with Public Accountability 
Next  we present relevant results  from a similar statistical  analysis  to 
gauge the effects of different regulatory  activities on the gender and racial 
composition of management.  Using the same data set discussed above, and 
similar models, we examined two of Sturm's broad insights regarding public 
accountability.  The first is that regulatory disincentives are not particularly 
effective mechanisms for reducing managerial job ~egregation.~~  Is this true 
in the corporate world, as it is in the academy?  We examined this by look- 
ing at the effects of three regulatory interventions: EEOC charges, lawsuits, 
and compliance reviews.  The second is that gender and racial equity will 
improve when the federal government seeks to identify and diffuse success- 
,  ful recruitment,  hiring, and promotion  strategies  that  increase  equality of 
~pportunity.~~  We  examined this  by  looking  at the effects  of  the original 
compliance reviews  of  the  1970s, which  were  designed  to  do just  that. 
These  early  compliance  reviews  also  capture  the  process  of  embedding 
knowledge that Sturm discusses, since the OFCCP's goal was to change em- 
ployer practice permanently.95 
1.  Regulatory Disincentives 
Table 2 examines the effect of disincentives.  It includes the results of a 
multiple  regression  analysis  similar  to  that  reported  in Table  1.  In  ths 
model, we analyze 814 work establishments on whch we have data for be- 
tween five and thirty-two years, with a median of  twenty-three years.96 
"See  Sturm, supra note 4, at 261-67. 
94 See id. at 267-68. 
95 See Anderson, szrpra note 42, at 298 (discussing OFCCP goals and methods). 
96 We increased the number of cases in  the models reported in Table 2, compared to 
those reported in Table 1, by estimating values for missing data.  Results were substan- 
tially similar when we omitted missing values, and results for Table 1 were substantially 
similar when we estimated missing values. 296  Harvard Journal of Law & Gender  [Vol. 30 
White  White  Black  Black 
Men  Women  Women  Men 
Regulatory activities: 
EEOC Charges  0.001  -0.001 
0.002  0.002 
Title VII lawsuits  -0.007*  0.016** 
0.002  0.003 
Compliance reviews  -0.029*  0.01 3 
0.010  0.0 10 
Other regulatory oversight: 
Government contractor  0.014  0.020 
0.0 17  0.018 
Affirmative action plan  -0.062**  0.020** 
0.015  0.016 
Coefficients from seemingly unrelated regression, unstandardized coefficients, stan- 
dard errors below the coefficients. Note: The analysis includes all variables appear- 
ing in Table 1 as well as fixed establishment and year effects. N (organization year, 
organization)= 18,474, 814. Number of parameters=68. The full model is available 
from the authors. 
** p<0.01;  * p<0.05;  (two tailed test) 
In Table 2 we show the estimated effects of  EEOC charges, lawsuits, 
and compliance reviews, isolated from the effects of all other factors that can 
shape managerial diversity.  Firms that faced EEOC charges show slight in- 
creases in black men in management with each additional charge.  Firms that 
faced Title VII lawsuits saw a significant negative effect on white men and 
significant  positive  effects  on all three  disadvantaged  groups.  Each addi- 
tional lawsuit reduced the subsequent proportion  of  white men in manage- 
ment  and increased the subsequent proportion  of  white and black  women, 
and of  black men.  The number of compliance reviews to date had a strong 
positive effect on black women and men, meaning that with each additional 
review,  employers  were  more  likely  to  see increases  in  these  groups  in 
management. 
We also looked  at the effects of being a federal contractor  (and thus 
being subject to affirmative action requirements) and of  having an affirrna- 20071  Evidence from Corporate Diversity Programs  297 
tive action plan.97 Firms under government contract show slight decreases in 
employment of black women.  And as above, those with affirmative  action 
plans  show  slight  decreases in employment  of white  men,  along with in- 
creases in numbers of  white women and black men. 
In Figure 2, we present the effect that the average number of  EEOC 
charges, lawsuits, or compliance reviews would have, for all cases that had 
at least one charge, suit, or review.  The average company with at least one 
EEOC charge had 8.9 charges by 2002, resulting in an increase of 9% in the 
proportion  of  black men  among managers.  The average company with  at 
least one lawsuit had 10.2 lawsuits that resulted in an increase of between 13 
and 19% in the proportion of women and minorities among managers.  The 
average company with at least one compliance review had 3.1 reviews, re- 
sulting in an increase in proportion of black men and women among rnanag- 
ers  of  slightly  more  than  10%.  These  statistics  suggest that  compliance 
reviews are more effective, but less common, than lawsuits. 
Mean Number of  Mean of Compliance  Mean of Lawsuits 
EEOC Charges (8.9)  Reviews (3.7)  (13.5) 
\  White Men  White Women  Black Women  El Black Men  1 
We  are  guided  to  the conclusion  that EEOC  charges,  lawsuits,  and 
OFCCP  compliance  reviews  have  been  effective  in  the corporate  world. 
EEOC charges had the smallest positive effects on diversity, significant only 
for black  men.  It seems likely that Title VII lawsuits and compliance re- 
97 In the analysis presented in Table 1 we treated affirmative action plan as a volun- 
tary activity.  Here, we examine it alongside other clear instances of  state-imposed regu- 
latory intervention. 298  Harvard Journal of Law & Gender  (Vol. 30 
views conducted by the OFCCP or by NSF might increase the representation 
of women in  the academy if  they were pursued more often. 
2.  Communities of Practice and the Original Compliance Review 
System 
Our second inquiry, summarized in Table 3, concerned the efficacy of 
the  OFCCP during the  1970s, when  it was  pursuing  compliance reviews 
designed to share and institutionalize  successful practices. 
In Table 3, we looked, using similar models to those presented in Tables 
1 and  2, at the effect of compliance reviews  and lawsuits by  decade.  We 
explored the effects of the original compliance reviews of the 1970s and the 
influence of  Reagan's  campaign  for deregulation  on  the efficacy of  both 
compliance reviews and lawsuits.y8 First Review 1970s represents the effect 
of a compliance review  in organizations  that had their first review  before 
1981.  First Review  1980s represents  the effect of a compliance review in 
organizations that had their first review from 1981 through  1992. First Re- 
view 1990s represents  the effects of a compliance review  in organizations 
that had their first review from 1993 through 2002. 
Note that because we have a separate variable estimating the effects of 
compliance reviews of  the  1970s-which  involved  promulgating  new  re- 
cruitment, hiring, and promotion practices-the  variable counting the num- 
ber  of  reviews  in  Table  3  captures  the  more  general  effect  of  OFCCP 
reviews. 
Figure  3 presents  the effects of  OFCCP compliance reviews graphi- 
cally, showing the estimated percentage change of  the proportion  of each 
group in management due to each event (compliance  review and lawsuits, 
respectively).  As  above, these bar charts allow us to compare the relative 
efficacy of different interventions. 
What we see in Table 3, in the first row, is that firms that  had their first 
compliance reviews in the  1970s, under that regime, showed  a significant 
increase in numbers of white and black women, and black men, in manage- 
ment.y9 By  contrast,  firms  that had  their  first  compliance review  in  the 
1980s saw only a significant  positive effect on numbers  of  white women. 
Firms  that had their  first review in the  1990s saw no  significant effects. 
These effects, which appear in Figure 3 most clearly, are on top of the effect 
of the simple number of reviews, which is captured by the variable Number 
of Reviews.  Taken together,  what we  see here is that compliance reviews 
are effective through the entire period, but that those conducted during the 
1970s were dramatically more effective.  It is not that compliance reviews 
98 In  examining the effects of  both compliance reviews and lawsuits, we  cut the de- 
cades not  at the  ten-year mark, but rather  at the time  when  the White Housc  changed 
parties in 1981 and  in 1992. , 
"Further  analyses show  that this increase was sustained into the 1990s. See Kalev 
& Dobbin, supru note 9, at 890. 20071  Evidence from Corporate Diversity Programs  299 
White  White  Black  Black 
Men  Women  Women  Men 
Compliance Reviews 
1st compliance review was in  the 70s 
1 
1st compliance review was in the 80s 
1st compliance review was in the 90s 
Title VZZ Lawsuits 
1st lawsuit was in the 70s 
1st lawsuit was in the 80s 
1st lawsuit was in  the 90s 
t 
Number of  reviews 
Number of  lawsuits 
R-sq 
Chi-sq 
Log Likelihood Ratio Test 
Coefficients  from  seemingly  unrelated  regression,  unstandardized  coefficients, 
standard  errors  below  the  coefficients. Note:  The  analysis includes all  variables 
appearing in Table 1 as well as fixed establishpent and year effects. N (organization 
year, organizations)= 18,474, 814. Number of parameters=68. The full model can be 
I  seen in  Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 7. 
** p<o.O1;  * p<0.05;  (two tailed test) 
did not have effects in the 1980s and 1990s, but that they had added "kick" 
in the  1970s.  The estimates in Table 3 for the effects of First Compliance 
Review 1970s were also the largest in the table, suggesting that this inter- 
vention was unusually effective.loO 
To verify that the reason for the large effects of compliance reviews in 
the 1970s is due to their emphases at the time-and  that it is not the case 
that all regulatory activity was simply more effective in the 1970s-we  in- 
'" Note  that because Number of  ReviewsISuits is not  a binary  variable, the  coeffi- 
cients are not  directly comparable. Harvard Journal of Law & Gender  [Vol. 30 
First Review 1970s  First Review 1980s  First Review 1990s 
10  White Men  White Women E  Black Women B3  Black Men  1 
clude a parallel  set of analyses for lawsuits.  Did firms that had their first 
lawsuit in the 1970s show greater increases in diversity than firms that ex- 
perienced their first lawsuit later?  That is not the case.  If we take into ac- 
count the effects of the Number of Lawsuits in Table 3 we see that firms that 
had  their  first lawsuit in  the  1980s saw-  slightly larger  increases in white 
women, and slightly smaller increases in black men, than firms that exper- 
ienced their first lawsuit in the  1970s or 1990s. 
This comparative analysis demonstrates that not all regulatory activity 
was more effective in the 1970s. Lawsuits were roughly equally effective in 
each decade.  Compliance reviews alone were significantly more effective in 
the 1970s, when their goal was to share successful innovations across federal 
contractors. 
Our analyses of data from private sector corporations provide compel- 
ling support for two of  Sturm's theories of inclusion.  First, we find strong 
support for her  ideas  about leadership.  Our results  support her  idea  that 
equity efforts will be most fruitful when the roles of  organizational leader 
and equity expert are merged.  We can see this in the surprising efficacy of 
diversity taskforces, which typically  bring together division chiefs to brain- 
storm for equal opportunity strategies and then implement those strategies in 
their own departments.  We also find that firms in which responsibility for 
equal opportunity is centralized subsequently increase the numbers of white Evidence from Corporate Diversity Programs 
i 
and black women, and black men, in management.  We can see this from the 
effect of having an affirmative action plan and, in particular, from the effect 
I  of having a diversity staffer or manager.  Both insights are also supported by 
our findings of the positive effect of having women or minorities in the top 
ten management positions.  When it comes to her ideas about how to institu- 
I  tionalize  effective equity  programs,  our results  provide  strong support for 
Sturm's theory. 
We cannot look directly at Sturm's  second main idea: that to succeed, 
equity programs must be framed in terms of organizational citizenship.  But 
we can look at Sturm's third broad hypothesis, about public accountability. 
On the one hand, Sturm argues that in  academia, regulatory  disincentives 
have not been very successful at promoting gender equity.lo1 We find that 
EEOC charges, and particularly civil rights lawsuits and OFCCP compliance 
reviews,  do have positive effects  on  the integration  of  corporate manage- 
ment.  This finding might inform future policy choices. 
On the other hand, Sturm argues that ADVANCE has been particularly 
effective because it uses positive incentives to engage universities,  offering 
funding for institutional change, and because it helps to foster communities 
of practice that identify  and disseminate effective equity measures.lo2 The 
closest analogy in regulation of  private enterprises was probably Kennedy's 
Plans for Progress group of the 1960s, which influenced the early oversight 
I  efforts of  the Department of  Labor's  OFCCP.lo3 In the 1970s, the OFCCP 
took lessons from Plans for Progress employers, and from employers it re- 
viewed, and used  those lessons  to advise other employers on recruitment, 
t  hiring, and promotion.lo4 The evidence for a more positive federal regula- 
tory effort, involving  federal officials  in helping  to identify  and promote 
successful equal opportunity strategies, is compelling.  In the 1970s, OFCCP 
compliance reviews had surprisingly strong positive effects on the diversity 
of  the managerial  workforce,  as  our  studies  show.  Firms that  underwent 
compliance reviews subsequently had significantly more women and black 
men in management.  This suggests that NSF's ADVANCE program may be 
pursuing the most promising regulatory route.  The challenge for NSF will 
be to bring the insights developed in its ADVANCE programs to other col- 
leges and universities. 
'01 Sturm, supra note 4, at 26147. 
lo'  See id, at 271 (identifying reasons for ADVANCE'S success). 
'07See  GRAHAM,  supra note 40, at 196 (describing Plans for Progress). 
r  I"  See Anderson, supra note 42, at 298-99  (OFCCP methods). 